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Developing the Information 
Industry in Taiwan: 
Entrepreneurial State, 
Guerrilla Capitalists, and 
Accommodative Technologists1 
Vincent Wei-cheng Wang 
THE RAPID GROWfH of the East Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs)- South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore- dur-
ing the 1960s and 1970s drew considerable academic interest and lively 
policy debates. By adopting export-led industrialization (EU) develop-
ment strategies, these NICs greatly benefitted from the remarkable 
expansion of world trade during the heyday of the Bretton Woods system, 
and rose to become major exporters of labor-intensive manufactured 
products (e.g., textiles and electronics). 
However, starting from the early 1980s, these NICs gradually (and 
perhaps irreversibly) lost their traditional competitive advantage in labor-
intensive products, and thus had to discover new sources of growth.2 Key 
economic decision-makers reached the conclusion that to regain com-
petitiveness in the world economy, the export-oriented economic struc-
tures of these NICs must be upgraded- that is, to become more tech-
nology- and skill-intensive. These NICs thus began to develop the 
so-called high-tech industries. In particular, information technology (IT) 
has been entrusted to play a central role in this new strategy. 
1 An earlier version of this paper was presented at the 1994 Annual Meeting of the American 
Political Science Association. 
2 This shift was caused by pressures from three fronts: from above (rising protectionism in the 
developed countries whose markets had absorbed much of NICs' exports), from below (increasing 
challenges from second-tier NICs, such as Thailand, Malaysia, China, where labor costs are even 
lower), and from within (soaring real wages and wakening environmental consciousness). 
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The modern IT affects aU sectors of the economy by providing both 
forward and backward linkages.3 It plays a crucial part in accelerating 
indigenous technological advancement and industrial upgrading. 
However, it should be noted that the term "industrial upgrading" does 
not just mean creating new ("sunrise") industries; it also includes apply-
ing new techniques and methods in traditional (or even "sunset") indus-
tries so as to increase their efficiency and value-added. In fact, for the 
NICs, this latter prospect is more important, because such traditional 
export sectors as textiles, footwear, consumer electronics, and electric 
components are still very important, in terms of their shares of employ-
ment and export volume. 
In addition to the economic appeal, IT has a political appeal. For 
many policy makers in the developing world concerned about their coun-
tries' standing in the world, developing IT offers an opportunity to dose 
up on the advanced industrialized countries (AICs).4 These economic 
and political motives of high-tech development will become evident when 
we consider the IT experience of one of the most successful NICs, Taiwan. 
This paper discusses the origins, evolution, current status, and future 
challenges of Taiwan's information industry. The discussions are some-
what unconventional in two respects. First, I do not see IT as a detached 
"new" sector that can be easily implanted overnight without any links to 
the economy at large. On the contrary, I recognize and emphasize the 
connections between IT and conventional sectors: Taiwan's high-technol-
ogy development was in fact an outgrowth of its previous successive devel-
opment strategies. Second, I do not view the development of IT as a 
purely economic decision. Most key economic policies, high-technology 
included, are also political decisions, with political determinants and 
consequences. 
The key findings of this paper are summarized here. The first point is 
that Taiwan's information industry was created on the solid foundation 
laid by the successful export-oriented electronics industry, and the cur-
3 Henry Nau, "National Policies for High Technology Development and Trade: An 
International and Comparative Assessment," in Francis W. Rushing and Caroles Ganz Brown, eds., 
National Policies for Develbping High Technology Industries: International Compa:risons (Boulder, CO: 
Westview, 1986), pp. 9-30; Richard R Nelson, High Technology Policies: A Five-Nation Comparison 
(Washington, DC: American Enterprise Institute, 1984); and Rushing and Brown, National Policies. 
4 Walter Arnold, "Science and Technology Development in Taiwan and South Korea," Asian 
Survey, vol. 28 (1988), pp. 437-50; Mohan Munasinghe, ed., Computers and Informatics inDeveWping 
Countries (London: Butterworth, 1989); Carlota Perez, "Microelectronics, Long Waves and World 
Structural Change: New Perspectives for Developing Countries," World Deuelnpment, vol. 13, 
no. 3(1985), pp. 441-63; Nathan Rosenberg, Ralph Landau, and David C. Mowery, eds., Technology 
and th£ Wealth of Nations (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992); Abdus Salam, Notes on Science, 
Technology, and Science Education in th£ Develnpment of th£ South (Trieste, Italy: The Third World 
Academy of Sciences, 1989). 
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rent technology-intensive strategy is a natural extension of Taiwan's pre-
vious development strategies. The second point is that the role of the 
Taiwanese state in promoting high-technology industries has been very 
important. The state has played a positive entrepreneurial part in the 
inception of pivotal technologies and in the export vigor of Taiwan's 
information industry on the world scene. However, the large state role has 
not seemingly led to negative consequences commonly found in other 
countries. The third point is that Taiwan's small- and medium-sized infor-
matics firms, or what I call "guerrilla capitalists," were arguably suited for 
some games (e.g., PCs and software) in this information technology race, 
due to their flexibility, agility, and assiduity. However, their small size 
becomes a serious disadvantage in othergames (e.g., semiconductors); this 
is where the entrepreneurial state has stepped in. The fourth point is that 
acquisition of high-technology in Taiwan has followed an accommodative 
model, by maintaining close ties with the global technological market and 
by harnessing MNCs' investment with the country's macroeconomic 
development, rather than by asserting narrow economic nationalism and 
restricting the domestic market. 
In sum, the contours of Taiwan's high-technology development have 
been shaped by a dynamic trio of entrepreneurial state, guerrilla capital-
ists, and accommodative technologists. 
The first section discusses the linkages between Taiwan's IT develop-
ment and its previous development strategies. The second section reviews 
the key policies of Taiwan's IT strategy. The third section examines the 
major institutions responsible for promoting IT in Taiwan. This paper 
concludes with a summary of the political economy of Taiwanese success 
in high-tech industries in light of relevant theories. 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY: THE l.ATESI DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
Unlike other LDCs with rich natural resources and large domestic 
markets, Taiwan has no significant resources, except perhaps its human 
resources and high savings rates. These endowment-based characteristics 
have defined Taiwan's development strategies. Most scholars agree that a 
pool of educated, well-trained, disciplined, and inexpensive unskilled and 
semiskilled labor was the bedrock of Taiwan's successful labor-intensive 
EU in the 1960s-70s. However, it is even more important to recognize 
that, for developing high-technology industries, Taiwan's exceptional 
combination of skilled labor (i.e., well-educated and, comparably speak-
ing, inexpensive engineers and scientists) and savings- both human and 
financial capital- constitute a major advantage. Such reasoning was so 
evident among the decision makers that it could be judged as a policy 
"consensus" on development. 
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Summing up Taiwan's postwar economic development, Dr. Otto Lin, 
former president of Taiwan's Industrial Technology Research Institute, 
provided this review: 
Taiwan's development strategy in the 1950s was to focus on labor-intensive 
import-substituting industries in order to lay a stable foundation for economic 
growth; in the 60s it was to orient domestic industries toward export promotion 
in order to create jobs; in the 70s it was to launch heavy and capital-intensive 
industries in order to facilitate industries' upward vertical integration; and in the 
80s it was to promote "strategic industries" and national key technologies in order 
to lead industries' upgrading and improve industries' structures.5 
It is thus important to understand Taiwan's current high-technology 
development as a logical extension from its previous development 
sequences, rather than a detached new undertaking. And without the foun-
dations laid by those successive strategies, IT could not have become a 
new viable source of growth and wealth for Taiwan. The following exam-
ple of the relationship between IT and electronics will illustrate these 
points. 
There existed close ties between IT and the electronics industry. In its 
formative years, IT had often been considered a part of the broad elec-
tronics industry, and grew out of the successful consumer electronics 
industry. Direct links existed between color TVs and color monitors, 
between integrated circuits (ICs) widely used in many consumer elec-
tronic products and computers, semiconductors and other components. 
Moreover, the technical expertise accumulated in the electronics industry 
was easily transferrable to the information industry. The information 
industry was not created in a total vacuum, as a result of a ''visionary" tech-
nocrat's grandiose proposal. Rather, it was built on and expanded the pre-
vious successes of the electronics industry in terms of success in the mar-
ket place and experience from learning. In addition, multinational 
corporations (MNCs) played a crucial formative role in Taiwan's elec-
tronics industry in the 1960s. More recently, however, they were also 
included in Taiwan's information drive, instead of being excluded. And 
broadly speaking, to maintain competitiveness in exports, which is the 
lifeline for an island economy like Taiwan, Taiwan must upgrade its prod-
ucts by moving gradually away from low-cost, labor-intensive commodities 
to high-value added, technology-intensive ones, and by concurrently 
increasing value-added mature products. 
Two additional arguments further underscore the ties between IT 
and the established sectors. First, IT in Taiwan from the start has been des-
5 Otto Lin, "An Outlook for the Technology Industries of the 1990s," Central Dairy NI!Ws (in 
Chinese), 1 January 1990, my translation. 
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ignated as a "strategic industry" - that is, a crucial industry that can pro-
vide both backward linkages to the established sectors (e.g., textiles and 
consumer electronics) by improving their productivity and prolonging 
their life cycles, and furward linkages to the nascent as well as established 
sectors by enhancing their technological development and creating new 
sources of competitiveness. 
Second, IT is entrusted with the task of correcting some of the nega-
tive externalities resulting from the previous growth-centered cum export-
push strategy. These new emphases include ( 1) improving the quality of 
life, instead of pursuing single-minded growth; (2) seeking more bal-
anced growth, which includes enriching the domestic market, instead of 
overweighing or over-depending on the foreign markets; (3) informa-
tionalizing the society, which will contribute to the empowerment of the 
citizenry- an essential element to democratic politics; and ( 4) salvaging 
the environment and overcoming infrastructural and transportation bot-
tlenecks- both being sacrificial lambs for a long period of extraordinary 
rapid growth. These new tasks assigned to IT are precisely the types of 
adjustments that need to be made in Taiwan's metamorphosis into a 
mature industrial democracy. It is not an exaggeration to characterize IT 
as the bridge for Taiwan -connecting a Third-World stardom status to a 
First-World prestige. 
Key decision-makers, industrialists, and intellectuals concerned with 
Taiwan's economic development long understood, and agreed on, the 
importance of informatics to their country's future. For instance, back in 
1979, K T. Li, a principal architect of Taiwan's economic development, 
stated, "[T]he development of the information industry is a worldwide 
trend, and Taiwan's economic future depends very much on our ability to 
catch up this trend. "6 
A virtual consensus on the need for continuous economic develop-
ment existed in Taiwan among a network of experts like Li, forming an 
epistemic community.' This community, throughout successive phases of 
Taiwan's post-war development, has often enjoyed strong political sup-
6 K. T. Li, "Targets and Strategies for Developing the Information Industry in the Republic of 
China," cited in Denis Fred Simon and Chi Schive, "Taiwan," in Rushing and Brown, National 
Policies, p. 201. 
7 On the concept of epistemic community, see Emanuel Adler, The Pmoer of Ideology: The Quest 
fur Technological Autonomy in A~na and Brazil (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987); 
Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination," 
International Organization, vol. 46, no. 1 (1992), pp. 1-36;John Kurt jacobsen, "Much Ado About 
Ideas: The Cognitive Factor in Economic Policy," World Politics, vol. 47 (1995), pp. 283-310; 
Kathryn Sikkink, Ideas and Institutions; Developmentalism in Brazil and Argmtina (Ithaca: Cornell 
University Press, 1991). 
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port (and autonomy) from the state, and has thus "embedded" many of 
its ideas in several key institutions, which perpetuates its political influ-
ence. The next two sections examine the most important policies and 
institutions responsible for promoting IT in Taiwan. 
KEY POUCIES OF TAIWAN'S IT DEVELOPMENT 
1980 marked the inauguration of Taiwan's concerted IT strategy, as a 
ten-year IT development plan (see below) was approved. The late presi-
dent Chiang Ching-kuo's personal plea served as a catalyst. He said: 
In recent years, by employing computers in improving management and tech-
nology, the U.S., Japan, and other [advanced industrialized] countries have 
gained rapid progress in production technology and significant increase in pro-
ductivity. In order for our nation's technology to catch up [with that of the 
advanced industrialized countries], we must popularize computer education and 
application. The government, the educational community, and the industry must 
make an all-out collective effort to develop the computer and information indus-
try, in order to upgrade our industries, and enhance the competitiveness of our 
nation's products in the world markets.8 
Chiang's advocacy symbolizes a correct and timely perception of the 
advent of the information society. The microelectronics revolution and 
the arrival of the microcomputers lowered the entry barrier for select 
LDCs (mostly NICs) and offered them a rare opportunity to join the 
global technological race and to transform their economies and societies.9 
In November 1984, Premier Yii Kuo-hwa pointed out the missions of 
Taiwan's "information industry strategy": 
(1) to promote effective utilization of computers in order to improve productiv-
ity and efficiency and add to living standards, (2) to open up the domestic mar-
ket in order to spur the development of the information industry, and (3) to 
upgrade technology in the information industry and then to expand the domes-
tic market into world export markets. 10 
8 Speech at a conference on finance and economics on 21 October 1980, cited from Institute 
for Information Industry (hereafter III), Infurmation Industry Yearbook, Taiwan, R.O.C., 1989 (in 
Chinese) (Taipei: III, 1989), p. i, my translation. 
9 As was well known only later, IBM's decision to use the "open architecture" for its PCs, which 
opened the Pandora's Box of compatible "clones" (as opposed to the proprietary technology used 
in its larger computers) and its late arrival (1981) in the PC market (already glutted with Apple 
and other vendors) provided that rare window of opportunity for the NICs studied here to jump 
into the technology race. It is also no wonder these NICs started their informatics forays roughly 
at this time. See Kenneth Flamm, Creating the Computer: Guuernmmt, Industry, and High Technology 
(Washington, DC: Brookings, 1988), p. 98; and Tom Forester, High-Tech Society: The Story of the 
Infurmation Technology Reoolution (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987), p. 206. 
10 Morris H. Crawford, Programming the Invisible Hand: The Computerization of Korea and Taiwan 
(Harvard University Center for Information Policy Research, 1986), p. 55. 
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These ideas about the importance of the information technology and 
the role played by the new information industry in Taiwan's economic 
transformation were codified in several important plans and embedded 
in several newly created institutions. The most important such plans were 
two ten-year plans for the information industry in Taiwan.11 
The Ten-Year Plan, 1980-1989 (10YP1) 
Taiwan's first national plan for the information industry12 had two 
central goals: (1) developing a new industry, and (2) promoting this 
industry for exports. To create a new industry, the plan called for promo-
tion of computers around the island so as to foster a favorable environ-
ment for the development of the local information industry. To promote 
computers as an export industry, the plan emphasized accumulation and 
upgrading capabilities in information technology. 
The 1 OYI\ called for the employment of four specific policies to 
achieve those twin goals: (1) nurturing the domestic market, by encour-
aging public and private enterprises to use computers; (2) manpower 
training, by fostering and training manpower for the information and 
computer industries, especially highly skilled experts; (3) introducing 
high technology, by improving the R&D environment, and establishing a 
comprehensive R&D system; and ( 4) improving the investment environ-
ment for the growth of the local information industry. 
In essence, the information and computer industries were designated 
as "strategic industries," eligible for special government assistance. Some 
concrete measures of government assistance have included: ( 1) asking 
designated development funds and financial institutions to grant prefer-
ential loan services to computer-related strategic products, (2) empower-
ing the Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park to give preferences to 
applications for computer-related development and manufacturing activ-
ities, (3) including computer-related strategic products in the Statute for 
Encouragement of Investment as eligible for those special incentives ear-
11 See Council for Economic Planning and Development ( CEPD) (Republic of China), Ten-Year 
Development Plan fur the InfUT7ffatitm Industry in Taiwan, R.O.C. (1990-2(){)()) (in Chinese) (Taipei: 
CEPD, 1990); and Ten-Year Development Plan fur the Infurmation Industry in Taiwan, R.O.C. 
(1980-1989) (in Chinese) (1982). A. related Ten-Year Long-Term Development for ROC's Science 
and Technology was promulgated in August 1986 to improve the general research and develop-
ment (R&D) environment. In addition, there is an assortment of laws, regulations, decrees, and 
administrative measures concerning the information industry. They are collected in III, 
Cmnpendium of InJUT7ffatitm Industry-&laWJ Laws and Regulations (in Chinese) (Taipei: III, 1989). 
12 10Y1 was drafted by III in 1980, at the request of the Council for Economic Planning and 
Development (CEPD), and approved by the cabinet in 1982. Its implementation began in 1982. 
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marked for "essential manufacturing activities," and (4) favorable gov-
ernment procurement oflocally made computer-related strategic products. 
The first ten years were the formative stage for Taiwan's information 
industry. In general, the implementation of this plan was successful, and 
the information industry began to take off. Through government pro-
motion and the private sector's adjustment to the new incentive structure, 
this industry witnessed rapid growth, having become a major force in the 
nation's economy and export, and, meantime, contributed to heightened 
public awareness. 
One way to evaluate the effectiveness of 10YP1 is to present a quanti-
tative profile of Taiwan's information industry. Table 1 shows the evolu-
tion of Taiwan's information industry over time. Table 2 shows the extent 
of dominance by certain Taiwanese information products in the world 
markets. As we can see from these statistics, during 10YP1 Taiwan's infor-
mation industry had transformed from an insignificant appendage to the 
electronics industry to an industry very important to Taiwan's economic 
vitality and export vigor. 
But it also encountered some bottlenecks. Although in 1988 Taiwan 
became a major world producer of information products (with sales of 
over US$ 5 billion), it was hindered by its dependence on imported key 
components, its weak name-brand recognition and marketing channels, 
and its technological bottleneck above the microcomputer level. 
Furthermore, there was still an acute shortage of information industry 
manpower, although the R&D expenditure generally met the target. 
Clearly, Taiwan's IT development needed a boost and reorientation. 
As a director at Taiwan's Institute for Information Industry (III) summed 
up, ''The emphasis for the first ten years was on the production of infor-
mation goods. The emphasis for the next ten years shall be on the appli-
cation [of IT in various aspects oflife]."13 A planning official in Taiwan's 
Council for Economic Planning and Development (CEPD) also con-
curred, "[The information industry] in the first ten years focused on 
hardware production and exportation. In 1 OYP 2, we shall actively promote 
software and the national market in order to create an information soci-
ety. "14 This is the background for the second ten-year plan. 
1
' C. J. Cherng, Director, Promotion and Services Division, III, personal interview, 23 July 1990, 
Taipei. 
14 Chuang Shu Cheng, Senior Specialist, Department of Sectoral Planning, CEPD, personal 
interview, 19 July 1990, Taipei. 
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TABLE 1. 
KEY INDICATORS OF TAIWAN'S INFORMATION INDUSTRY, 1978-1991 
1978 1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 
Total output* 32 
Growth rate (%) 
-
As% of GNP 0.1 
Ranking in all industries 
-
Export value -
Growth rate (%) -
Export ratio(%)** 
-
Share of total exports (%) 
-
Ranking in all export industries -
Share of global information product market (%) -
Global ranking as producer of information products -
Total manpower (1000) 0.9 
Unit: US$ Million 
Note: *Includes export value and domestic sales (retail prices) 
**Export value I total output 
46 78 109 
43.8 69.6 39.7 
0.2 0.3 0.2 
- - -
- - -
- -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
- - -
1.3 2.2 3.1 
166 432 1,039 1,260 2,134 3,839 5,168 5,484 6,149 6,908 
52.3 260.2 240.5 21.3 69.4 80 34.6 6.1 12.1 12.3 
0.4 0.8 1.8 2.2 2.7 3.7 4.2 3.6 3.8 3.9 
- - - - 23 18 13 10 9 9 
- - - 1,220 2,063 3,701 4,999 5,244 5,873 6,546 
- - - - 69.1 79.4 35.1 4.9 12 11.5 
- - -
96.8 96.7 96.4 96.7 95.6 95.5 94.8 
- - - 3.9 5.2 6.9 8.5 8.1 8.7 8.9 
- - - 11 7 4 3 3 3 3 
- - - 1.0 1.5 2.4 3.1 3.0 3.0 3.1 
- - 9 7 7 6 6 7 7 
4.7 12 29 30 38 50 66 80 
Source: Compiled and calculated from III, lnftrrmation Industry Yearoook, Taiwan, R.O.C., 1992, 1991, 1990 
~ 
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TABLE 2. 
TAIWAN'S TOP 10 INFORMATION PRODUCTS, 1994 
Product 1994 1994 % of World Market 
Monitors 
Portable PCs 
Desktop PCs 
PC system board 
Power supplies 
Scanners 
Terminals 
Graphic cards 
Mice 
Keyboards 
lAN cards 
Sound cards 
Unit: ,000 
Domestic 
Production 
14,391 
2,057 
3,090 
11,529 
12,150 
1,663 
1,060 
5,040 
22,052 
7,068 
6,100 
1,986 
Domestic + Overseas 
Production 
24,028 
2,057 
3,090 
17,545 
25,960 
1,663 
1,060 
8,770 
29,800 
22,800 
6,120 
1,986 
Source: III, &trospect and Prospects of the lnfurmation Industry, 1994-95 (in Chinese) 
Ten-Year Plan, 1990-2000 (JOYP2) 
(Units) 
56% 
28% 
8% 
80% 
31% 
61% 
22% 
32% 
80% 
52% 
34% 
11% 
This plan was drafted in 1990 based on the accomplishments and 
shortcomings of the IOYI\ and an evaluation of the development trends 
of the world's·information technology. It symbolizes Taiwan's aspiration 
to become an "information Goliath. "15 
It seeks to accomplish four goals. The first is to popularize the uti-
lization of information technology so as to increase productivity of the 
overall industrial structure and improve people's quality of life. As I 
argued earlier, this is the most important new raison detre of IT, one dif-
ferent from that of the old mainstay of low-cost, low-Wage, growth-cen-
tered projects. The -second goal is to make Taiwan a major supplier of 
information products by developing crucial components and technology, 
upgrading product quality, and controlling marketing channels. The 
third goal is to achieve technological autonomy by expanding the scope 
and level of R&D investment through participation by both the govern-
ment and the business. The second and third goals together present a dif-
ficult yet crucial task for Taiwan: to transform itself from a reliable OEM 
(original equipment manufacturer) contented with cut-throat profits 
earned from simple assembly to a technological leader reaping techn<r 
logical rents. And in a very crude sense, this is what distinguishes the First 
15 Free China journal, 20 September 1990, p. 4, and 24 September 1990, p. 7. 
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World from the Third World. The fourth goal is to train a large pool of 
information manpower as a solid foundation of an information society by 
raising both the quality and quantity of manpower. This perhaps holds the 
key to the accomplishment of the previous two objectives. To sum up, 
10YP2 identifies the following areas as priorities: computer application, IT 
output, R&D, and manpower training. 
Severa) goals are noteworthy. The plan projects that Taiwan's share in 
the global IT market will rise from 1.9 percent in 1988 to 3.1 percent in 
2000. As it turned out, however, this goal had already been met in 1991 
(see table 1). In addition, the plan seeks to steadily raise the total R&D 
expenditures in industry revenues: from 3 percent in 1988 to 5 percent in 
1995, and to 6.5 percent in 2000. By then, the private sector's investment 
in R&D will top that of the government by a four-to-one margin. 
The most distinctive features of 10YP2 can be summarized as follows. 
First, although the plan still views the information industry as an impor-
tant export leader, it further charges this industry with the task of dis-
semination of information and improvement of life quality of citizens. 
This is a marked departure from the previous "growth first, all for export" 
economic ideology. Second, the plan recognizes the maturation of hard-
ware assembly, and instead stresses the development of indigenous R&D 
on key components and technologies. Third, more importantly, the plan 
views software as the future leading force for Taiwan's information indus-
try, and designates special incentives to software (e.g., a software indus-
trial park). Given Taiwan's comparative advantage in skilled labor (i.e., 
well-trained yet inexpensive scientists and engineers), this is a market 
niche Taiwan should focus on. In fact, it may not be an overstatement to 
say that strength in software (knowledge and technology defined as the 
ability to solve complex problems) is a new source of the wealth of 
nations.16 
As explained earlier, the power of economic ideas rests in institutions. 
The next section examines these institutions. 
16 Robert U. Ayres, 'Technology: The Wealth of Nations," Technological Forecasting and Social 
Change, vol. 33 (1988), pp. 189-201; and Rosenberg, Landau, and Mowery, Technology. On issues 
related to the development of software by developing countries, see David O'Connor, 'The 
Computer Industry in the Third World: Policy, Options, and Constraints," World Development, 
vol. 13, no. 2 (1985), pp. 311-32; Robert &hware, "Software Industry Strategies for Developing 
Countries: A 'Walking on Two Legs' Proposition," World Development, vol. 20, no. 2 (1992), 
pp. 14~4; "Software for Developing Countries: Major Issues in the 1990s," Infurmatiun Technology 
for Development, vol. 5, no. 2 (1990), pp. 101-8; "Software Industry Development in the Third 
World: Policy Guidelines, Institutional Options, and Consttaints," World Development, vol. 15, no. 
10-11 (1987), pp. 1249-67. 
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INSTITUTIONS PROMOTING IT DEVELOPMENT IN TAIWAN 
Figure 1 shows the major organizations promoting the information 
industry in Taiwan. The appendix of figure 1 lists the functions per-
formed by these various institutions. 
Figure 1 illustrates the identity of institutions and their participation 
in Taiwan's information industry. At the highest level, the Executive 'fuan 
(cabinet) provides general policy guidance. Various cabinet bodies are 
involved in the tasks of planning, coordination, and monitoring. These 
include the National Science Council (NSC), the Ministry of Economic 
Affairs (MOEA), the Council for Economic Planning and Development 
(CEPD), and the Ministry of Communications (MOC). Three entities are 
of particular importance to Taiwan's information industry: the Hsinchu 
Science-based Industrial Park,l7 the Electronics Research and Service 
Organization of the Industrial Technology Research Institute, and the 
Institute for Information Industry. 
Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park (HSIP) 
Often lauded as 'Taiwan's Silicon Valley," HSIP, located 55 miles 
(90 km) south of Taipei in the booming technopolis ofHsinchu, was cre-
ated in 1980 to spearhead Taiwan's high-technology development. By pro-
viding special incentives to advanced personnel and companies engaged 
in high-technology activities, HSIP encourages industrial technology 
research and innovation. It is appropriate to characterize HSIP as a 
"second-generation export processing zone" (EPZ), which defined 
Taiwan's successful EU in the 1960s and early 70s. There are in fact some 
similarities between EPZ and HSIP, such as an assortment of incentives, 
export orientation, and labor-intensiveness. But the similarities are only 
superficial. In a nutshell, HSIP is an upgraded form of EPZ, with higher 
R&D emphasis, higher-caliber employees, and higher productivity.18 
17 HSIP was created under the NSC, symbolizing the R&D orientation of the park. In contrast, 
HSIP's predecessor, the much-touted export processing zones (EPZ) which defmed Taiwan's suc-
cess during EU1, were founded by the MOEA. 
18 A recent survey found that on average firms in HSIP spent 6 percent of revenues on R&D, 
whereas for the general manufacturing sector only 1 percent; nearly half ( 48 percent) of the 
HSIP's workers have college education or above, but for local manufacturers it is only 8 percent. 
Compiled from F'fW! China journal, 15 July 1994, p. 8. 
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FIGURE 1. 
MAJOR ORGANIZATIONS PROMOTING THE INFORMATION INDUSTRY IN TAIWAN 
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APPENDIX TO FIGURE 1 
NAMES AND FuNCTIONS OF ORGANIZATIONS PROMOTING THE INFORMATION INDUSTRY 
IN TAIWAN 
1. Executive Yuan (Cabinet): its Research, Development and Evaluation Commission 
Functions: mapping out and fostering the establishment of an administrative information sys-
tem and the development of the local information industry 
2. NSC = National Science Council 
a. Electro-optics and Technology Committee (EOC) 
Functions: 
(1) Planning and promoting electro-optical science & technology and industrial develop-
ment 
(2) Promoting (through exhibits, publications, and training) electro-optical science & tech-
nology and industry 
(3) Industry consultancy 
b. Science and Technology Information Center (STIC) 
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Functions: 
(1) Collecting, analyzing, and processing computer information from both local and inter-
national sources 
(2) Introducing valuable foreign data banks 
(3) Establishing a national data bank for local science & technology periodicals, journals, 
and dissertations 
(4) Increasing international cooperation and information exchange 
(5) Establishing a national science & technology information network, and providing on-
line consulting service 
c. HSIP = Hsinchu Science-based Industrial Park 
Functions: 
(1) Stimulating industrial technology research and innovation 
(2) Promoting high-technology development by providing special incentives 
(3) Attracting advanced science & technology personnel 
(4) Advancing industrial upgrading and creating new global competitive edge 
3. MOEA = Ministry of Economic Affairs 
a. IDB = Industrial Development Bureau: its Second Division (Electronics, Electrical, and 
Information Industries) 
Functions: 
(I) Promoting the development of the local information and electronic industries 
(2) Evaluating the applications for computer investments by overseas Chinese and foreign 
nationals (to introduce new technologies) 
(3) Executing the cabinet-approved plans regarding the development of the information 
and electronics industries 
(4) Setting up projects and assistance measures for the information and electronics indus-
tries 
(5) Manag¥:1g loans earmarked for the strategic industries, including information, elec-
tronics~ computer hardware and software, and communications equipment industries 
(6) Executing the R & D projects jointly developed by MOEA, ITRI, and Ill 
b. Production Automation Committee (PAC) 
Functions: Executing and evaluating national industrial automation programs, and provid-
ing technical support to the automation industry 
c. OSTA =Office of Science and Technology Advisors 
Functions: 
(I) Coordinating and facilitating measures for science & technology development under 
the Cabinet 
(2) Evaluating and assisting science & technology research projects 
d. Industrial Development and Investment Center 
Functions: 
(I) Promoting investment and technical cooperation projects by foreigners and overseas 
Chinese 
(2) Promoting outward investment 
4. CEPD = Council for Economic Planning and Development: its Sectoral Planning Department 
Functions: Sectoral development planning for the information industry 
5. MOC = Ministry of Communications 
a. DCI = Data Communications Institute 
Functions: 
(1) Providing public information processing services (PIPS), including packet._jtched 
public data network, electronic mail, and videotex 
(2) Developing technologies related to digital communications 
(3) Developing a large-&ale information processing system 
b. Te!Lab = Telecommunication Laboratories 
Functions: Providing technical support to the Directorate-General of Telecommunications 
in such fields as network planning system technology, information technology, and circu-
lating technology 
6. ITRI = Industrial Technology Research Institute 
a. ERSO = Electronics Research and Service Organization 
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Functions: 
(1) Developing submicron (ULSI) production process technology 
(2) Developing microelectronics technology 
(3} Developing automation industrial technology 
( 4) Developing microwave and precision machinery technology 
(5) Developing computer system technology 
(6) Developing communication electronics technology 
(7) Developing computer packaging technology 
(8} Developing electronic product reliability technology 
b. CCL = Computer and Communication Research Laboratories 
Functions: 
(1) Upgrading computer and communications technologies 
(2) Developing digital electronic technology and advanced information technology 
(3) Facilitating the development of computer, communications, and digital consumer elec-
tronics industries 
(4) Promoting the application of system integration technology 
c. Opto-electronics and Systems Laboratories 
Functions: 
(1) Establishing the complete and advanced technologies for computer peripherals 
(2) Integrating multi-media technologies 
(3) Establishing research centers for optical design, electro-optical components and tech-
nologies 
( 4) Establishing functional and passive components and technologies to support compu-ter 
and communication industries 
d. Mechanical Industry Research Laboratories 
Functions: 
(1) R & D in the fields of precision machinery, thermal mechanics transportation, and 
automation 
(2) Transfer of R & D results (both technologies and products) to the private sector 
7. III = Institute for Information Industry 
Functions: 
(1) Assisting the government in mapping out short-, mid-, and long-term development 
plans for the information industry 
(2) Assisting government agencies and state-run enterprises with the task of computeriza-
tion 
(3) Training the manpower of the information industry 
( 4) Studying and introducing advanced software technologies in order to upgrade local 
software design capabilities 
(5) Fostering the development oflocal computer-related industries 
(6) Promoting computer usage, and upgrading the level of computer application 
(7) Providing market and technology intelligence 
(8) Assisting in improving the environment for investment in the local information 
industry 
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Perhaps the greatest contribution of HSIP so far has been its role in 
technology transfer. This is seen in its increasing attractiveness to the 
returning expatriates. HSIP has to some extent reversed the brain drain. 19 
Many firms in HSIP were founded by Chinese-American scientists and 
engineers, many in well-knit teams, who had obtained advanced degrees, 
and worked in positions of prominence in the U.S.20 
However, the diffusion model is not the only modus operandi in HSIP. 
Several prominent and equally important industrialists rose from a com-
pletely different track, which I call an "indigenous path." The most promi-
nent example is Stan Shih- "Taiwan's Bill Gates"- the shoestring entre-
preneur who founded the Acer Corporation. Originating as an OEM for 
IBM, NEC, AT&T, etc., Acer has established its own name brand and risen 
to become the world's seventh largest computer manufacturer. 21 
The HSIP model is quite unique in two respects, based on a survey of 
science parks around the world, especially among the LDCs.22 First, it 
combines both manufacturing and R&D. In fact, HSIP was built to create 
a synergy between the two.23 Second, this park in recent years has become 
a magnet for returning Chinese-American scientists and engineers, caus-
ing a mini reversal of brain drain. Since there is an accumulated pool of 
19 One publication reversed the term "brain drain" altogether, and call it Taiwan's "brain gain," 
Business Week, 7 December 1992, pp. 133-35. 
2° For a sketch of some of these individuals, see Vincent WeH:heng Wang, High Technology and 
Development Strategies in East Asia and Latin Amtrica, Ph.D. diss., University of Chicago (1995), 
pp. 124-25. 
21 Miami Herald, 7 August 1995, p. 15. 
22 Kuniko Fujita, "fhe Technopolis: High Technology and Regional Development in Japan," 
International journal oflMJan and Regional Research, vol. 12, no. 4 (1988), pp. 566-94;John Michel 
Gibb, ed., Science Pmlcs and Innovation Centers: Their ECQIIIYI1Iic and Social Impact (Amsterdam: Elsevier 
Science Publishers B.V. for the Commission of the European Communities, 1985); Amy K. 
Glasmeier, 'The Japanese Technopolis Programme: High-tech Development Strategy or Industrial 
Policy in Disguise?" International journal of lMJan and Regional Research, vol. 12, no. 2 (1988), 
pp. 268--84; C. S. P. Monck, R. B. Porter, P. Quintas, D. J. Storey with P. Wynarczyk, Science Paries and 
the Growth of High Technology Finns (London: Croom Helm, 1988); Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), Science Paries and Technology Complexes in Relation to 
&gional Development (Paris: OECD, 1987); and Raymond W. Smilor, David V. Gibson, and George 
Kozmetsky, "Creating the Technopolis: High-Technology Development in Austin, Texas," Journal of 
Business Venturing; vol. 4 (1989), pp. 49-67. 
23 In contrast, South Korea's Dae Dok Science Town contains clusters of public research insti-
tutions, but no manufacturing facilities. Development of science parks in Latin America is virtually 
non-existent. The maquiladora (in-bond) factories along the U.S.-Mexican border mainly serve as 
offshore assemblers for U.S. firms. They are more like Taiwan's old EPZs. Brazil's Manaus Free 
Trade Zone has ironically become an odd import haven in a sea of domestic market protection. 
However, India has two important places for high-technology products: ( 1) Santa Cruz Electronics 
Export Processing Zone (SEEPZ) in Bombay and, more recently, (2) the southern city of 
Bangalore, both evidently inspired by Silicon Valley, and both having significantly cultivated India's 
software manpower and information exports. 
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such talents, Taiwan may be in a unique position with such human capi-
tal, which is a rare advantage for any LDC. In this regard, HSIP will con-
tinue to play a key role in transferring technology- via experienced sci-
entists and engineers seeking to realize their entrepreneurial ambitions. 
Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI) 
The Industrial Development Bureau (IDB) under the Ministry of 
Economic Affairs (MOEA) is the government body involved in the daily 
administration of industrial development. 24 Under the supervision of 
MOEA and CEPD are two important organizations charged with R&D: 
ITRI and III. The Industrial Technology Research Institute (ITRI), estab-
lished in 1974, was charged with R&D on hardware: computers, ICs, 
peripherals, semiconductors, and communication equipment. In 1974, 
ERSO (Electronics Research and Service Organization) was created 
under ITRI, and has since been involved in every generation of semicon-
ductor development in Taiwan- from the IC (integrated circuits) proj-
ect in the 1970s, to the VLSI (very large-scale integrated circuits) project 
in the 1980s, and to the submicron project of the 1990s. In fact, the estab-
lishment of ERSO was directly related to Taiwan's first IC project -
through a licensing agreement with the American firm, RCA.25 
In the early years, ITRI even played the role as an incubator and man-
ufacturer. The United Microelectronics Corp. (UMC), one of Taiwan's 
largest and most successful IC houses, originated as a spinoff of ERS0.26 
There was also a high interchange of personnel between ERSO and the 
industry, or, more accurately, the exodus of ERSO employees to the pri-
vate industry, because of the higher pay offered by industry. Exchange of 
personnel and expertise among ERSO, academia, and the industry is also 
quite common - in fact it was facilitated by geographic proximity and 
institutional support. Furthermore, joint research is actively encouraged, 
especially in Hsinchu. This may be necessary given Taiwan's industrial 
structure, which is dominated by small- and medium-sized firms. The dif-
24 Shih-<hien Yang, director-general, IDB, personal interview, 30 July 1990, Taipei. The 10YP1 
was mainly Yang's imprimatur when he worked at the CEPD, having recently returned to Taiwan 
with a Ph.D in engineering from Northwestern University. Yang's proposals were quickly endorsed 
by Li, who then recruited Yang as one of his key lieutenants. Yang is now a vice economics minis-
ter. 
25 For discussions on ERSO's roles in these projects, see Constance Squires Meaney, "State 
Policy and the Development of Taiwan's Semiconductor Industry," paper presented at the 
Conference on State Policy and Economic Development in Taiwan, R.O.C., Taipei, 4-5 December 
1989; Sung Gul Hong, The Politics of Industrial Leapfrogging: The Semiconductor Industry in Taiwan and 
South Kurea, Ph.D diss., Northwestern University (1992), pp. 81-90; and Wang, High Technology, 
pp. 157-68. 
26 Otto Lin, president, ITRI, personal interview, 14 September 1990, Hsinchu. 
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fusion effect of the ITRI/ERSO/RCA model was dearly felt in Taiwan's 
high-tech community. Over the years ERSO has trained numerous com-
petent IC design and fabrication personnel, enabling Taiwan to become 
one of the few countries in the world that possesses credible IC design 
and fabrication capabilities. 
As has been said earlier, the Taiwanese state has often stepped in to 
pick up the slack where the private sector is either insufficient or unwill-
ing to move in. However, to create positive externalities in learning and 
cooperation within the industry, the government has in recent years tried 
to involve the private sector in joint R&D coordinated by the state (e.g., 
the five-year submicron technology development plan). 
But in recent years, ITRI has concentrated on developing plausible 
industrial technologies and then transferring them for commercial pro-
duction to interested and qualified private companies, usually in HSIP. By 
drawing an ample supply of capable technical manpower from the two 
nearby leading technology universities, Tsing-hua and Chiao-tung, and by 
feeding research results to the firms in HSIP, ITRI played a very positive 
role as a bridge between research and production, or as a conveyor belt 
between technology and commodity. Its focus on industrial and applied 
technology, as opposed to purely basic research, and its focus on D rather 
than R avoided many common mistakes found in other NICs. 
Institute for Information Industry (III) 
The III, established in 1979 at Li's behest, was charged with R&D on 
software, market intelligence, and dissemination of information technol-
ogy. Jointly supported by the government, academic institutions, and pri-
vate organizations, III's main mission is software development, including 
providing advice and guidance to the government and private organiza-
tions. In recent years, III has become the most important body for the 
training of the much needed information industry manpower. Moreover, 
its Market Intelligence Center (MIC) has provided market intelligence to 
both the public and private sectors.27 Further, the government in recent 
years has requested III to inspect so(tware and hardware for exports in 
compliance with intellectual property rights protection.28 
27 Irving Ho, president, III, personal interview, 30 July 1990, Taipei; C. J. Cherng, personal 
interview, 23 July 1990, Taipei. 
28 Foreign Broadcast Information Seroia: China-Daily &port (hereafter FBIS-CHI), 18 May 1992, 
p. 70; 4 May 1992, p. 58; and 30 Aprill992, p. 53. 
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III's most important task in recent years is the Software Engineering 
Environment Development (SEED) project. SEED's goal, according to 
Huang Wei-teh, III's vice president, is "to computerize everything possible 
(in Taiwan)." The SEED project, launched by III in 1988 with an invest-
ment of US$20 million, sought to provide an infrastructure for further 
development of the high value-added products and pollution-free soft-
ware industry requiring very litde labor or space. This is important 
because, as Huang asserts, "Taiwan produces 10 percent of total world 
output of personal computers, yet computer application in this country is 
[still] very limited." Software products made up about 10 percent of 
Taiwan's total information industry which was expected to spearhead 
future technological growth in the country.29 
Naturally, other institutions such as OSTA, IDIC, DCI, and Tel Lab are 
also important. However, other noninstitutional features not shown on 
the chart are worth mentioning. The chiefs of ITRI, ERSO, and III (or 
Taiwan's industrialist-bureaucrat elites for that matter) had all been 
trained in top U.S. engineering schools, had worked for renowned U.S. 
companies and had reached prominent positions before they returned to 
Taiwan and began to experiment with their expertise. This is a more 
effective means of technology transfer'<' than the conventional one, which 
equates higher technology with novel "chic" products. 
Several conclusions can be drawn from this discussion of the institu-
tions promoting the information industry in Taiwan. First, the institu-
tional arrangements of Taiwan's information industry reflect the wide-
spread acceptance of the new economic ideology of enhancing national 
economy and quality of life through information technology. They also 
reflect key policy planners' view that the information industry holds a 
central place in Taiwan's new development strategy in light of the new 
challenges facing the nation. 
Second, various institutional and legal infrastructures were created to 
facilitate the development of the information industry. Especially worth 
noting are the organic relationships among the government, public 
research labs, technology universities, and private businesses. The 
ITRI/III/HSIP model constitutes as much a bottom-up mode of indus-
trial policy-making as the traditional and less effective top-down mode. 
The type of joint R&D is perhaps a harbinger of high-technology devel-
29 Free China journal, 2July 1990, p. 7. 
30 Hsien..:hee Fang, vice-chairman, III, and special advisor, ITRI, personal interview, 27 July 
1990, Taipei. Dr. Fang left the Telecommunications Directorate in 1975 to become ITRI's presi-
dent. In 1979, he became III's first president. 
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opment. The instrumental role of the state in initiating novel projects 
need not be denied. However, in order for a project to sustain itself and 
prosper, the private sector must be involved and take over through "spill-
over" or "trickl~own" effects. 
Third, not shown on the organizational chart is the enormous influ-
ence wielded by this particular high-technology epistemic community. 
The impact of such key figures as K T. Li and Y. S. Sun (ex-premier and 
benefactor of the IC project) simply can not be underestimated. They did 
so much to chart Taiwan's high-technology expedition. 
CONCLUSION: THE POUTICAL ECONOMY OF TAIWANESE SUCCESS 
IN HIGH-TECH INDUSTRIES 
We can now revisit the most salient elements of Taiwanese success in 
high-tech development: the entrepreneurial state, guerrilla capitalists, 
and the accommodative technologists. 
Entrepreneurial State 
The first factor in the discussion of patterns of high-technology devel-
opment is the role of the state. The role of the state in creating high-tech-
nology industries, AICs and LDCs alike, is indispensable. This is because 
high-technology industries, as Tyson argues, possess the following charac-
teristics: imperfect competition, strategic behavior, dynamic economies of 
scale, and technological externalities, hence providing a fertile breeding 
ground for interventionist policies. "Nearly everyone now concedes that 
competitive advantage in high-technology industries is created [emphasis 
added], not endowed by nature, and that governments the world over 
have earmarked them for special support. "~1 
Although I agree with Li's argument that "depoliticization" (i.e., lib-
eralization of the economy) was a key reason for Taiwan's "growth with 
equity" model in the last four decades,~2 I would argue that the new devel-
opment strategy (technology-intensive EU), which intends to overcome 
the bottlenecks encountered by continued labor-intensive EU, actually 
necessitates a reinvolvement of the state in creating new comparative 
advantages. Nevertheless, this new active state role is defined by new 
democratic politics. 
31 Laura D'Andrea Tyson, H-7w's Bashing Whom~ Trade Conflict in High-Technology Industries 
(Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1992), p. 9. 
32 K. T. Li, The Evolution of Policy Behind Taiwan s DeuelopmnU Sucass (New Haven: Yale University 
Press, 1988). 
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Specifically, the state in Taiwan has performed three essential tasks 
with regard to high technology development. The first is to provide guid-
ance and sequence timing of projects. The second is to provide legal 
(e.g., statutes and laws) and institutional infrastructures (e.g., III, ITRI, 
HSIP). The third is to directly become the producer in some cases of mar-
ket failures. The state wears the complementary hats of administrator and 
entrepreneur. 
The question of why the Taiwanese state was able to play an important 
and positive role in the development of high-technology industries poses 
interesting theoretical puzzles. Although the state has assumed an increas-
ingly important role as an entrepreneur in the production and distribu-
tion of goods and services, particularly in developing countries, earlier 
scholarship was often quite skeptical or uncertain about the state's entre-
preneurial functions.~~ However, more recently several interesting studies 
have found positive functions for the state from the Taiwanese case 
(e.g., with regard to export expansion and the position of wage labor).34 
I would argue that in developing high-technology industries, state entre-
preneurship in Taiwan was a necessary response to Taiwan's decentralized 
industrial structure, dominated by small- and medium-sized firms (to be 
elaborated upon later), limited technological resources and entrepre-
neurship, and the state's own developmental vision. It played a key role, 
and made some smart choices. 
However, now it must work in a new political environment, which is 
subject to democratic scrutiny, and must acquire a new political style. The 
early "easy success" on hardware expansion has gradually given way to a 
more fundamental improvement of software, service, and application. 
This is because the elevation of national well-being requires "informa-
tionalization" of the society, to which this new approach is critical. 
33 Raymond D. Duvall and John R Freeman, "'The Techno-Bureaucratic Elite and the 
Entrepreneurial State in Dependent Development," American Political Science Review, vol. 77 ( 1983), 
pp. 569-87; "'The State and Dependent Capitalism," International Studies QJ.<arterly, vol. 25 (1981), 
pp. 99-118. 
34 Steve Chan, Cal Clark, and David R Davis, "State Entrepreneurship, Foreign Investment, 
Export Expansion, and Economic Growth," jrmrnal of Conflict &solution, vol. 34, no. 1 (1990), 
pp. 102-29; Cal Clark, "'The Consequences of State Entrepreneurship: A Taiwan Case Study," 
Pacific Focus, vol. 2, no. 2 (1987), p. 77-94; and David R Davis and Michael D. Ward, "'The 
Entrepreneurial State: Evidence from Taiwan," Comparative Political Studies, vol. 23, no. 3 (1990), 
pp. 314-33. 
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In sum, the state in Taiwan is developmentally oriented,35 committed 
to furthering economic growth and technological advancement. In the 
case of a high-tech industry such as IT, the state has done more than just 
correct market failures; it has also strived to created new sources of com-
petitive advantage. 
Guerrilla Capitalists 
The second factor in the discussion of patterns of high-tech develop-
mentis industrial structure. In this regard, Taiwan's decentralized (small-
and medium-sized firms) structure has often been contrasted with 
Korea's centralized (chaebol) model. Table 3 compares South Korea's "big-
ness" and Taiwan's "smallness" models. ~ach model entails distinct 
strengths and weaknesses and each seems suitable for peculiar niches in 
the global high technology industries. Naturally, the contrasts between 
TABLE 3. 
THE KOREAN VS. THE TAIWANESE MODEL: BIG VS. SMALL 
The Korean Model The Taiwanese Model 
economy of scale high low 
entrepreneurialism low high 
response to market slow fast 
signals 
technological cross subsidization of free-ride on state R&D 
development R&D 
suitable products standardized commodity customized or design-
products (e.g., DRAMs) intensive niche products 
(e.g., ASICs) 
nature of agents' powerful but corruptible democratic but frag-
bargaining (oligopoly) mented (competition) 
government-business from domination to state leadership in some 
relationship symbiosis? sectors, followership in 
others 
suitable for industrial better worse? 
upgrading 
key limitation costly mistakes size limitation 
~ See Chalmers Johnson, MIT/ and the JapafU!Se Mimcle: The Growth of Industrial Policy (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1982); and "Political Institutions and Economic Performance: The 
Government-Business Relationship in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan," in Frederic C. Deyo, ed., 
The Political Ecmwmy of the New Asian Industrialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987), 
PP· 136--64. 
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the two models are the results of domestic social, economic, and political 
variables but they indicate that there is "more than one road to Rome" for 
LDCs' high-technology development. 
Conventional wisdom holds that the Korean model is better suited for 
IT. But actually the new information revolution could benefit Taiwan's 
decentralized industrial structure. Resembling the Silicon Valley model, 
this model's strengths lie in the cultivation of innovative and flexible small 
entrepreneurs who respond promptly to market trends. The small design 
houses can also take advantage of ample local engineering talents. Yet, 
smaller firms are hampered by their size, especially on projects that 
require massive and risky investments (e.g., memory chips). This is where 
market failures occur, and where the state has stepped in. 
Calling Taiwan's decentralized strategy the "mushroom model," Yang 
Shih-chien, a key figure in lOYI\ and Li's apostle, draws a very illuminat-
ing contrast: "Taiwan envies Korea's and Japan's points (i.e., conglomer-
ates), yet they admire our surface (i.e., thousands of 'mushrooms'). "gij This 
mushroom metaphor is quite catchy. The microelectronic revolution is 
that propitious technological rain, which nourishes thousands of mush-
rooms to thrive all over the high-tech green pasture. This is essentially 
how Silicon Valley (San jose, California) got started, and how it was so dif-
ferent from Route 128 (near Boston).~7 In the Taiwanese context, it for-
tuitously blends well with the somewhat unflattering Chinese cultural 
propensity to "rather be the head of the chicken than be the tail of the 
cow" (i.e., to be one's own boss, no matter how small it is), which is said 
to have led to Taiwan's decentralized, small firm-dominated industrial 
structure. Because the electronic and computer industries from the very 
start received relatively modest state support, they had to become com-
petitive in order to survive. The state's actions were largely limited to pro-
viding a good institutional and legal infrastructure and re-prioritizing 
incentive structures.38 
!16 Personal interview, 30 July 1990, Taipei. 
57 On the auspicious origins of Silicon Valley, see Everett M. Rogers and Judith K. Larsen, Silicon 
Valley Fever: Growth of High-Technology Culture (New York: Basic Books, 1984); MichaelS. Malone, The 
Big Score: The Billion-Dollar Story of Silicon Valley (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1985); Ann Markusen, 
Peter Hall, and Amy Glasmeier, High Tech America: The What, H001, lflum, and My of the Sunrise 
Industries (Boston: Allen & Unwin, 1986); and Forester, High-Tech Society. One interesting study, 
Anna Lee Saxenian, Regional Advantage: Culture and Competition in Silicon Valley and Route 128 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994), draws the regional disparities of high-technology 
industries between Silicon Valley and Route 128. 
!!8 It should be pointed out that state intervention varies across the various sectors of the IT 
industry, ranging from low in computers and peripherals to high in semiconductors. 
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In contrast, the South Korean model of high-technology develop-
ment can be characterized as an oligopolistic model. Vertically integrated 
and horizontally diversified into a wide array of industrial and financial 
sectors, these chaebol can achieve economy of scale and cross-subsidiza-
tion. They can even take a long-term business perspective by employing 
predatory practices (e.g., dumping) to secure market shares. Their orga-
nization efficiency is fully realized in the manufacturing of commodity 
products suited for mass fabrication (e.g., memory chips). However, due 
to their growing size and bureaucratization, South Korean chaebol are 
often slower than their Taiwanese competitors in responding to changing 
market signals. 59 Also, the chaebol have made several costly mistakes in 
the past, because each was trying to outspend the others and together 
they sought to challenge the American and Japanese industry leaders 
head on. 
Compared with the Korea, Inc. or the conglomerate model, Taiwan's 
information industry has pursued a "niche" strategy. This "mushroom" 
model is suitable for Taiwan, thanks to its small firms. It is more "democ-
ratic" in that it popularizes the information movement and proliferates 
high-caliber manpower. The niche strategy allows commercial agility and 
selective specialization. It will probably fare better against the neoprotec-
tionist mood in the AICs (e.g., in the form of antidumping). These capi-
talists nimbly pursue business opportunities everywhere, and in their 
mind, no order is too small. They are guerrilla capitalists in the global 
commercial battle. Small can be beautiful; and selective can be competi-
tive. This leads to the final point. 
Accommodative Technologists 
The third factor in the discussion of patterns of high-technology 
development is the choice of technology policy. The information indus-
try is a very dynamic and fast moving industry, in which yesterday's win-
ners and winning strategies can easily become tomorrow's losers. The cri-
sis, failures, and restructuring of America's major computer companies 
(e.g., IBM, Digital, Wang, among others) give some indication of the chal-
lenges facing even the most successful Taiwanese companies. The debates 
over proprietary vs. "open" technologies, super vs. micro systems, central-
ized vs. decentralized models, and basic vs. commercial R&D all pose fun-
damental questions as to the appropriate choice of strategies in high-tech-
nology development. 
39 As a sarcastic journalist quipped, "H Taiwan is a ferocious cat. Korea is a newly born ele-
phant." F,mgn Broadeast Information Service: Nortluasi Asia-Daily &port. 12 March 1992, p. 24. 
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TABLE 4. 
AssERTIVE AND ACCOMMODATIVE INFORMATICS POUCIES -A STYLIZED CoMPARISON 
Characteristics 
basic orientation 
market concentration 
&sertive Model 
import-substituting 
domestic 
government support/protection: 
- import restrictions high and widespread 
- market reserves yes 
-venture capital provision yes 
- R & D "in-house" I coordinative 
- special incentives for yes 
"strategic industries" 
- state-owned firms 
- government procure-
ment favoring local 
firms 
major objectives: 
development starts with 
linkage direction 
relationships with 
- existing industries 
- user requirements 
- export opportunities 
price of products 
quality of products 
technological 
sophistication 
sectoral emphasis 
role ofMNCs 
division of labor between 
MNCs and local firms 
country cases 
prevalent 
prevalent and explicit 
technological autonomy 
nationalism 
systems 
backward 
weak 
weak 
weak 
high 
low 
high 
vertical 
(microeconomic) 
marginal/ excluded 
segmented markets (e.g., 
only local firms for PCs, 
but MNCs allowed in 
other segments) 
Brazil, Mexico, India, 
France 
Accommodative Model 
export-oriented 
global 
low and selective 
no 
yes 
mostly coordinative 
yes 
no 
infrequent and implicit 
efficiency I 
competitiveness 
industrial upgrading 
peripherals 
forward 
strong (e.g., consumer 
electronics) 
strong 
strong 
low 
high 
low but increasing 
horizontal 
(macroeconomic) 
important/involved 
organic cooperation at 
lower ends and moving 
up to higher ends 
Taiwan, South Korea, 
(Japan) 
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Generally speaking, Taiwanese companies are not inventors, which 
define the "paradigms" of technological progress. Rather, most of them 
are learners, and a few of them are innovators. So the challenge for a suc-
cessful NIC like Taiwan is how to transform itself from a copycat to a true 
inventor. On this point, we find an interesting divergence on lww to 
accomplish this goal: Taiwan has adopted an "accommodative" strategy, 
whereas countries such as Brazil and India have adopted an "assertive" 
strategy. Table 4 summarizes these two models.40 
As can be seen from this table, countries adopting accommodative 
high-tech strategy usually strive to incorporate high-tech industries in 
their overall macroeconomic adjustment. This is certainly true in the 
Taiwanese case. Furthermore, access to world markets and foreign tech-
nology also ensures the viability of the industry. By contrast, countries 
adopting the assertive strategy have sought to "break the shackles of the 
product cycle" by creating a "national" high-tech base, without regard to 
cost-benefit effectiveness. 
The Taiwanese case shows that purely "national" technology, devel-
oped independent of world technological trends, is both undesirable and 
impossible. The very dynamic nature of IT industry calls for constant 
adaptation and learning. Taiwan's information industry in the early 
period emphasized and capitalized from hardware, thanks to the oppor-
tunities created by PC and microelectronics, and the ability to seize these 
opportunities. Over the years, through introduction, learning, and adap-
tation of foreign technologies, the industry has gradually moved up the 
technological ladder. It was not done by closing the borders. Rather, it was 
done through a dynamic division of labor between the state, MNCs, and 
local firms. In the years to come, this industry's emphasis will shift to soft-
ware and application as part of a grass-root movement toward an infor-
mation society. A change in attitudes toward information and the ability 
to use it may be a prerequisite for the upgrading of the society and econ-
omy. Acquisition of technology was done in an accom71Wdative manner with 
a view to harnessing it with the nation's overall economic development. It 
was not done by asserting narrow economic nationalism and shutting off 
external trends. · 
In sum, the drama of Taiwan's information industry is played out by 
the dynamic trio of the entrepreneurial state, guerrilla capitalists, and 
accommodative technologists. The success of a NIC like Taiwan in devel-
oping high-tech offers optimism for the Third World: a nation's place in 
the international system is not ascribed, but acquired. 
University of Miami, September 1995 
4() See Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "Models of High Technology Development in the East Asian 
and Latin American NICs," Pacific Focus, vol. 9, no. 2 (1994), pp. 5-42. 
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